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HYBRID RIGHTS: CouRT-ORDERED CoNFUSION
Br BRYAN GJVIDEN*

0

n Dece mber 17, 2004, Ray and Louise Spiering sought
for and received a temporary injunction from United
States District Court for the District of Nebraska to stop
the mandatory blood-draw of their soon-to-be-born
infant.' The Spierings, followers of Scientology principles, believe
that exposing a newborn to pain during the first week of the baby's
life can cause detrimental mental or physical effects.2 They argued
that the mandatory blood-draw violated their First Amendment free
exercise right and their fundamental right to raise their children
how they deem best. 3 The federal court offered a temporary injunction in the case of that birth, but ruled that any future children
born to the Spierings would have to be tested despite their religious
beliefs.4
In March 2006, Joey Wirthlin, Jr.'s second-grade teacher at Estabrook Elementary School in Lexington, Massachusetts, read aloud
a picture book detailing the quest of a prince who must marry. Unable to find a princess whom he loves, the prince ultimately falls in
love with another prince and marries. 5 When Joey reported the story
to his parents, the Wirthlins-Christians who believe that homosex-
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See Spiering v. Heineman, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1132-3 (D. Neb. 2006).
2

See id. at 1132.

3

See id. at 1139.

4

See id. at 1142.

5

See Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 93 (I st Cir. 2008).
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uality is a sin- were distraught, causing them to meet with school
administrators. 6 The Wirthlins requested only that they be notified
when topics regarding homosexuality would be taught so they could
have the choice of withdrawing Joey from school. When the school
denied their repeated requests, the Wirthlins and other families took
their case to the legal systern7 where they were also denied. 8
Each of these cases presents a different claim regarding the freedom of religion. The consistent thread through each is the assertion
of another right in addition to the religious claim-the Spierings'
rights to raise their child9 and the Wirthlins' rights to direct the education of their child. 1 Coupling rights together to argue a constitutional violation is often referred to as a hybrid-rights claim. However, does asserting a hybrid right provide greater strength compared
to arguing that the right only infringes the Free Exercise Clause?
Exactly how do courts interpret and rule on hybrid-rights claims?
No one really knows.
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment expressly provides that Congress cannot make any laws which inhibit citizens'
religious practices. That explicit right has evolved at different points
in constitutional history with various limits imposed upon that right.
In the controversial metamorphosis of Free Exercise interpretation,
Employment Division v. Smith, 11 the opinion of the Court carved out
a new boundary, including the articulation of a new realm to First
Amendment jurisprudence- hybrid-rights claims. This new realm
did not supplant previous free exercise jurisprudence, but limited
the breadth of protection that the First Amendment provides to only
those infringements which are not neutral and those which prove
that some additional constitutional right has been violated. The hybrid-rights theory can be summarized by two words: controversy

°

6

See id.

7

See id. at 93- 94.

8

See id. at 107.

9

See Spiering v. Heineman, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Neb. 2006).

10

See Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008).

II

Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 ( 1990).
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and confusion. The resulting confusion has broken the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals into different interpretations of what constitutes a hybrid right. Though the disparities in definitions have not
yet produced a critical error in a case, the potential for such mistakes
is high . To remedy this situation, the Supreme Court must examine a hybrid-rights case on certiorari and establish the standard for
hybrid-rights claims.

l. HISTORY OF TH E FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
Freedom to believe and act according to religious dictates is a
significant part of the American foundation oflaw. The First Amendment requires that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.''12 The
bounds of the First Amendment evolved over the course of American history. The large scope of precedent enveloping the first two
hundred years of the Constitution's existence precedes even the intimation of a hybrid-rights theory.
The Free Exercise Clause received little attention from the Supreme Court during the first century of U.S. history. The preeminent free exercise case is Reynolds v. United States. 13 In that case,
the federal government brought charges against George Reynolds, a
member of the Church ofJesus Christ ofLatter-day Saints and practicing bigamist. Reynolds argued that marrying multiple wives was
his religious duty as taught by his church and that his first amendment right to free exercise of religion prohibited his prosecution. 14
In response, the Supreme Court established the first legal doctrine that limited the Free Exercise Clause. The Court declared that
though the right to religious belief is absolute, it is within the United
States' right to limit religious action.15 This belief-action dichotomy
12

U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.

13

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).

14

See id. at 161-62.

15

See id. at 166 (declaring that "laws are made for the government of actions,
and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions,
they may with practices.").
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prohibited Congress from making any law which required or punished any religious belief, but allowed them to continue legislation
that could potentially infringe on people's religious actions. The
Reynolds decision did not, however, establish to what extent the federal government could legislate behavior.
The interpretation of the Bill of Rights in the early 1900s disseminated the restrictions of the First Amendment to apply to all
levels of government. The Court confirmed that the Free Exercise
Clause was under the Fourteenth Amendment umbrella of due process.16 As a result of the increased breadth of protection, the Court
needed to establish some test which provided bounds for how the
government could and could not legislate behavior. Such a test came
in the Court's ruling on Sherbert v. Verner. 11
A Seventh-day Adventist was denied unemployment benefits by
South Carolina since she refused suitable employment that required
her to work on Saturdays- a day Seventh-day Adventists believe
God bas set aside for worship. 18 The Supreme Court ruled that the
denial of benefits infringed on Sherbert's freedom to exercise her
religious beliefs because it required her either to act against her religious scruples or to forego government compensation intended to
help citizens such as herself. 19 Simultaneously the Court established
the first orderly test for determining Free Exercise infringement.
16

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (specifically, "The
fundamental concept of liberty established in [the Fourteenth Amendment] embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. The First
Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth
Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as
Congress to enact such laws.").

17

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

18

See id. at 399..

19

See id. at 404-05 (especially, "Nor may the ... statute be saved from constitutional infirmity on the ground that unemployment benefits are not appellant's 'right' but merely a 'privilege.' .. . To condition the availability of
benefits upon this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of
her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties").
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The test established in Sherbert requires that a judge determine
whether or not a statute or policy infringes upon a person's free exercise of rei igion. If the judge determines that an individual's sincere
religious exercise is substantially burdened by the statute or policy,
the judge must examine the government's perspective in the issue.20
The government must prove there is a compelling governmental
interest in imposing the burden upon the individuaP 1 and, if such
an interest exists, that it is the leas t restrictive way the government
could impose such a burden. 22
Over the subsequent years, the Supreme Court and Federal
Courts of Appeal re-affirmed the Sherbert test as the canon for deciding Free Exercise claims. Federal Appellate Court cases on topics
ranging from Hare Krishna's presence and actions at a state fair23 to
Cherokee Indians protesting the damming and flooding of a sacred
region24 all used the Sherbert test to determine constitutionality.
Most notable among the affirmations is Yoder v. Wisconsin,
wherein the Supreme Court determined that laws that are generally
neutral to religion in purpose can be declared unconstitutional if
they have the effect of creating a burden on religious practice.25 Jonas Yoder, a devout member of an Amish community, withdrew his
children from public schooling after the eighth grade under the sincere belief that having his children continue public schooling would
20

See id. at 403 (where the question of whether law "imposes any burden of
free exercise of appellant's religion" is posed).

21

See id. at 406 (the Court considers "whether some compelling state interest... justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's First Amendment
right.").

22

See id. at 407-08 (description of how this case differs from previous law
which was declared constitutional because the State proved a compelling
interest and similarly proved it was the least intrusive law).

23

Edwards v. Md. State Fair &Agric. Soc'y, 628 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1980).

24

Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).

25

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,220 (1972) (expressly rejecting the notion that a case should be dismissed because a law "applies uniformly to all
citizens of a State and does not, on its face, discriminate against rel igions or
a particular religion, or that it is motivated by legitimate secular concerns").
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"endanger their own salvation and that of their children."26 As a result, he was convicted under a Wisconsin statute requiring parents
to have their children attend public schooling until age sixteenY The
Supreme Court ruled the Wisconsin statute invalid,28 establishing
that though a law may be neutral on its face, if it does not fit within
the confines of Sherbert, 29 it violates the Free Exercise Clause.
After three decades of consistent free exercise jurisprudence,
the Supreme Court dramatically shifted its interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause in Employment Division v. Smith.

II.

HISTORY AND fiNDINGS OF EMPLOYMENT DIVISION V. SMITH

The Employment court was given the task of ruling on the constitutionality of an Oregon law banning peyote possession. 30 The decision from Employment did not follow the Sherbert test31 which was
26

See id. at 209.

27

See id. at note 2.

28

See id. at 234.

29

See id. at 220 (where, citing Sherbert as evidence, the Court declares, "A
regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the
constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens
the free exercise of religion.").

30

The Court juggled Employment with the Supreme Court of Oregon. The
court passed from the state court to the federal court, back to the state court,
again to the Supreme Court (where it made the ruling at hand), and finally
passed back to the state court. Though the original issue posed to the Supreme Court was a matter of unemployment benefits very similar to Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), eventually the case focused primarily
on the validity of the Oregon peyote law.

31

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (the test was fonnulated to treat a
free exercise claim regarding unemployment compensation. The test applied strict scrutiny rather than the rational basis standard. The test posed
three primary questions which must be applied in succession: (l) has an
individual's legitimate religious exercise been burdened, (2) does the government have a compelling state interest in burdening the religious activity
(or inactivity), and (3) is it the least restrictive means by which the state can
accomplish its interests?).
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the assumed jurisprudence.32 Rather, Justice Anton in Scalia stated
the limits of free exercise protection and distinguished Employment
from the central cases forming free exercise doctrine at that time.
Justice Scalia's interpretation of the First Amendment hearkens
back to the belief-action dichotomy presented in Reynolds v. United
States.33 The opinion then takes the dichotomy a step further and
specifies what types of government intervention are considered appropriate. Justice Scalia writes, "It is a permissible reading of the
[First Amendment] ... to say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion . .. is not the object of[a law or policy] but merely the incidental
effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the
First Amendment has not been offended." 34
Justice Scalia answered the pressing question of how Employment differed from cases such as Cantwell v. Connecticut, 35 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 36 and Sherbert v. Verner when the Court had ruled that
violation of the Free Exercise Clause warranted strict scrutiny and
overturned errant statutes. The opinion first distinguishes Sherbert
from Employment since the policy in question for Sherbert was non32

The assumption that Sherbert would be applied is indicated by two things:
( I) The Court never requested briefs regarding criminal laws of general
applicability - both parties to the case focused their oral arguments and
briefs to how Sherbert ought to be applied to the Employment case; (2) Justice O'Connor's dissent where it indicated Employment Div. "dramatically
departs from well-settled First Amendment jur isprudence," Employment
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 89 1 (1990). Similarly, law review articles
examining religious issues prior to Employment Div. examined it in light
of Sherbert and Yoder, e.g., MarkS. Cohen, American Indian Sacred Religious Sites and Government Development: A Conventional An-alysis in an
Unconventional Setting, 85 MICH . L. REv. 77 1 (1987).

33

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879) (that "laws are made
for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere
religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.").

34

Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).

35

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-7 (where the Court struck
down a licensing system requiring rel igious organizations to seek approval
prior to soliciting).

36

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1 972).
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criminal in nature (unemployment benefits) and, ergo, not relevant to
the validity of a statute that is criminal in nature as it was in Employment.37 This clarification of constitutional law provides the current
mode of determining the constitutionality of generally applicable
law that is neutral on its face.
However, in explaining his distinction of Cantwell and Yoder,
Justice Scalia clarifies that
[t]he only decisions in which we have held that the First
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not
the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause
in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as
freedom of speech and of the press or the right of parents to
direct the education of their children.38
The Justice goes on to declare that the free exercise claim against the
Oregon peyote law "does not present such a hybrid situation." 39 The
Court declared the Oregon statute constitutional and did not offer
relief for those affected.40 In doing so, it established a new realm of
free exercise jurisprudence that is determined on whether or not a
claim is a "hybrid situation."
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor concurred with the decision, but
not the opinion. Justice O'Connor argued, in contrast to Justice Scalia's assertions, that violations of the Free Exercise Clause warrant
strict scrutiny and that the "hybrid" cases excluded by Justice Scalia were "rejected ... [by the Court] only after carefully weighing the competing interests.'" 1 While many continue to hold to this
argument, in light of both the fact that Employment has not been
37

See Employment Div., 494 U.S . at 884 (where Justice Scalia rejects use of
the Sherbert test, saying, "Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert
some life beyond the unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law.").

38

Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 881 (citations omitted).

39

Employment Div. , 494 U.S. at 882.

40

See Employment Div. , 494 U.S. at 890.

41

Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 896 (Connor, J., concurring).
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overturned and that it ought to be consistent with previous case law,
jurists must conclude that the cases cited by Justice Scalia as "hybrid
cases" are successful assertions of hybrid-rights cases. Those cases
then serve as models of how future hybrid-rights cases ought to be
determined.
The Supreme Court has not given further affirmation on the
breadth or validity of hybrid rights since Employment. 42 Furthermore, no court case has been appealed to the Court on a hybridrights claim.

Ill. REACTION TO EMPLOYMENT DJYISlON V.

SMITH: CONTROVERSY

Justice O'Connor's concurrence was the first to point out the
conflict between Employment and Sherbert. Justice O'Connor, who
felt the state proved a compelling interest in banning the possession of peyote,43 could not agree with the opinion's reasoning. She
explicitly called the Court's opinion a departure from current First
Amendment jurisprudence44 and specifically attacked the establishment of a hybrid-right theory.4 5
Much of the legal community responded similarly. By the end
of 1991, less than twenty months after the decision, no fewer than a
dozen prominent law journals published reviews of the case or ar42

The Court's only direct commentary on hybrid-rights claims comes from
Justice Souter's concurrence in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring). This will briefly be
discussed later.

43

See Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 903-05 (Connor, J., concurring) (Justice
O'Connor follows the Sherbert pattern methodically: at 903, "There is no
dispute that Oregon's criminal prohibition of peyote places a severe burden on the ability of respondents to freely exercise their religion," at 904,
"There is also no dispute that Oregon has a significant interest in enforcing
laws that control the possession and use of controlled substances by its citizens," and finally at, 905, "Thus, the critical question in this case is whether
exempting respondents from the State's general criminal prohibition 'will
unduly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest."') (citations
omitted).

44

See Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 901 (Connor, J., concurring).

45

See Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 896 (Connor, J., concurring).
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ticles that treated it negatively or cast skepticism on Justice Scalia's
decision to depart from the Sherbert and Yoder standards.46 Political activists began working to overturn the new standard for free
exercise claims.
In 1993, Congress responded by passing the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) 47 which was a direct response to the Employment ruling. 48 Many states followed suit and passed their own
versions of the Act to expand religious liberty at the state level.
46

"Prominent" is classified as law journals published by any ABA law school.
References for said journal articles are as follows: Michael W. McConnell,
Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. II 09
(I 990). Patricia M. Wald, "One Nation Indivisible, with Liberty and Justice
for All'': Lessons from the American Experience for Ne111 Democracies, 59
FORDHAM L. REv. 283 (1990). The Supreme Court, /989 Term: Leading
Cases: I. Constihttional Law; C. Free Exercise of Religion., I04 HARV. L.
REv. 198 (1990). James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop,
79 CAL. L. REv. 91 (1991). Gerard V. Bradley, Free Exercise Exemptions
and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 245 (I991). Charles
A. Reich, The Individual Sector, 100 YALE L.J. 1409 (1991). Timothy L.
Hall, Roger Williams and the Foundations ofReligious Liberty, 71 B.U. L.
REv. 455 (I991). Roberto A. Torricella, Jr., BabaluAye Is Not Pleased: Majoritarianism and the Erosion ofFree Exercise, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. I 061
( 1991 ). Kenneth Marin, Employment Div. v. Smith: The Supreme Court
Alters the State ofFree Exercise Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1431 (1991).
Spencer E. Davis, Jr., Constitutional Right ofLegislative Grace: The Status
ofConscientious Objection Exemptions, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 191 (1991).
Edward Egan Smith, The Criminalization of Belief When Free Exercise
Isn't, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1491 (1991). Roald Mykkeltvdet, Employment Div.
v. Smith: Creating Anxiety by Relieving Tension, 58 TENN. L. REv. 603
( 1991). Mary Ann Glendon and Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise,
90 MICH. L. REv. 477 (I991). (The author of this paper could find no more
than four prominent journals during the same era which supported it or did
not directly cast doubt on its validity).

47

Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 USCS § 2000bb (2008). The Act
prohibits Congress from enacting laws which go against the Sherbert interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.

48

The state-level application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was
overturned in City of Boerne v. Flores, 52 1 U.S. 507 ( 1997). However, the
Federal prohibition remains good law, see Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 4 I 8 (2006).
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As of this paper's authoring, thirteen different states have passed
laws modeled after the RFRA. 49
Review of the Free Exercise Clause history up to Employment
and its subsequent controversial fallout serves to demonstrate that
the hybrid rights theory first proposed therein is a signi·ficant aberration in, if not deviation in, First Amendment interpretation. Understanding the unsettled nature from whence hybrid rights came helps
to understand why the hybrid-rights theory itself is an unsettled matter for lower federal courts to consistently apply.

IV. PosT-EMPLOYMENT INTERPRETATION

OF THE fREE EXERCISE

CLAUSE £N f EDERAL APPELLATE COURTS

The Employment decision's classification of Cantwell and Yoder
as "hybrid situation[s]"50 caused confusion for lower federal courts
and state courts that exists to this day. The comments in Employment regarding hybrid situations are incredibly brief and establish
no clear standard for other courts to determine if petitions or litigation brought before them constitute valid hybrid-rights claims. As a
result, the different circuit courts of appeals have divided themselves
into different interpretations of hybrid-rights claims. The interpretations include (1) the dicta interpretation- that Justice Scalia's mention of hybrid rights in Employment is simply dicta; (2) the stringent
interpretation- that a hybrid-right exists and strict scrutiny is required only when matched with an independently viable claim; and
(3) the colorable claim interpretation-that a hybrid-rights claim is
49

amend. 622, ARIZ.

R EV. STAT. § 41-1493 (2008), CoNN.
52-57lb (2007), FLA. STAT.§ 761 (2008), IDAHo Coos
ANN. § 73-401 (2008), 775 I LL. CoMP. STAT. 35/1 - 99 (2008), Mo.
Rev. STAT. § 1.302 (2008), N.M. STAT. § 28-22-1 through 28-22-5
(2008), 71 PA. CONS. STAT. 2401 (2009), R.I. G EN. LAWS § 42-80.1-1
(2008), S.C. CoDE ANN. § 1-32-10 (2008), T EX. Civ. PRAc. & REM.
CODE ANN . § 110.00 I (2008), VA. CODE. ANN. § 57-2.02 (2008).
ALA. CONST.

G EN. STAT.§

50

See Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 882.
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constituted when a "colorable claim" is proven to violate a free exercise right conjoined with another right.
A. DICTA iNTERPRETATION

A dicta interpretation would indicate that the hybrid-rights theory is totally irrelevant in deciding a court case. The idea that Justice Scalia's comments regarding hybrid situations were not meant to
qualify a new area of claims was first proposed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The Court disregarded a student's argument that the validity of her claim deserved strict scrutiny51 because
it violated the Free Exercise Clause io conjunction with other constitutional rights. It decided it did "not sec how a state regulation would
violate the Free Exercise Clause if it implicates other constitutional
rights but would not violate the free Exercise Clause if it did not
implicate other constitutional rights."52 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit also classified the hybrid rights test of Employment to
be dicta 53 and, later, explicitly adopted the interpretation that hybridrights claims were not at all binding on the court's decisions. 54
51

Kissinger v. Board ofTrustees of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 179 (6th Cir.
1993).

52

See id at 180. Additionally the judge held that Kissinger misread Vandiver
v. Hardin County Bd. ofEduc., 925 F.2d 927, 932 (6th Cir. 1991), declaring that since "did not hold that the legal standard under the Free Exercise
Clause depends on whether a free exercise claim is coupled with other constitutional rights," Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 180. This seems to be a strained
reading of Vandiver which does not merely "discuss 'hybrid' claims," but
instead explicitly declares they ought to receive some sort of special right,
see Vandiver v. Hardin County Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927, 932-33 (6th
Cir. 1993) ("Smith does recognize a special place in first amendment jurisprudence for those "hybrid" statutes which affect not only religiously
motivated actions but also burden other constitutionally protected rights ...
The Smith decision implies without stating that those hybrid claims which
raise a free exercise challenge coupled with other constitutional concerns
remain subject to strict scrutiny.") (citations omitted).

53

Knight v. Conn. Dep'tofPub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2001).

54

Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 2003).
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The ramifications of a dicta interpretation are rather sweeping.
Without hybrid-rights exceptions on which to challenge statutes,
there is essentially no recourse for a person whose rei igion is validly
burdened by a generally neutral law. A judge does not have to determine if a burden is placed on a person's religion; instead, a judge
simply has to determine if a law is generally neutral. If the law is
neutral, then it receives no further examination. If it is not neutral,
then it receives strict scrutiny.ss
The dicta interpretation finds strength in avoiding the biases
brought by judges; there is a clear rule established by Employment
that does not have caveats. This clean and logical approach is a
strength for new hybrid-rights cases. However, the history and reasoning that led to hybrid-rights weakens this theory substantially. If
Justice Scalia's rationale for distinguishing Employment from Yoder
and Cantwell is simply commentary, not actual doctrine, then there
is no logical reason to distinguish those cases from Employment.
Without a reason to distinguish them, either Justic·e O'Connor's accusation that the Court "dramatically departs from well-settled First
Amendment jurisprudence"56 holds or Justice Scalia measured Employment incorrectly. An interpretation of hybrid-rights, derived
from the text in Employment, should at least allow Employment to be
consistent with itself.
B. STRINGENT I NTERPRETATION

Rather than dismissing the hybrid-rights language altogether,
other courts assume that infractions against religious free exercise
requires strict scrutiny, but only when it violates another constitutional right independent of free exercise. This interpretation's foun55

See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993) (ruling "if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices
because oftheir religious motivation, the law is not neutral and it is invalid
unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to
advance that interest.") (citations omitted).

56

Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 891 (1990) (Connor, J., concurring).
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dations are found in the first circuit court case Brown v. Hot, Sexy
& Safer Prods., Inc. 51 Two minors' parents brought a claim against a
school district and a contracted safe-sex motivational speaker for violati ng their free exercise of religion and their right to educate their
children as they dictate. 58 After acknowledging the hybrid-rights situation discussed in Employment, the court implicitly reasoned that
the citation of Yoder by the Employment court established Yoder as a
successful hybrid-rights case,59 and then denied the parents' claims
since, unlike Yoder, the "free exercise challenge [was] not conjoined
with an independently protected constitutional protection.'060 The
first circuit courts, for the most part,61 continue to use this stringent
interpretation, emphasizing the model role of Yoder.62
The stringent interpretation plugs the holes that the dicta interpretation leaves; mainly, the ability to incorporate previous Supreme
Court decisions with the decision found in Employment. The clarity
of the stringent interpretation seems to be just as strong as the dicta
interpretation giving it legitimacy to be used by diverse judges.
The problem attached to the stringent interpretation is, again, the
logical value of it. In fact, the only statement the Supreme Court has
uttered directly on the subject of hybrid rights presents the fallacious
57

Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F. 3d 525 (I st Cir. 1995).

58

See id. at 529- 30.

59

See id. at 539 (calling Yoder "the most relevant of the so-called hybrid
cases.").

60

!d.

61

McCullen v. Coakley, No. 08-1 0066-JLT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 64560,
note 266 (D. Mass 2008) provides a singular exception to first circuit court
cases that follow the stringent interpretation. The judge in McCullen rationalizes away the precedent set by superior courts in his own district and
then subscribes to the dicta interpretation.

62

See Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 241 F. Supp. 2d Ill, 121 (D.N.H.
2003); see also Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008) (of particular
note is where court states, at 98, that it will not "[enter] the fray over the
meaning and application of Smith's "hybrid situations" language, we approach the parents' claims as the Court did in Yoder," indicating that though
they would not permanently define the hybrid-rights interpretation, they did
feel Yoder provided an adequate model to determine hybrid-rights claims).
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standing of a stringent interpretation. Justice Souter, concurring in
the first Supreme Court case to re-affirm Employment,63 writes,
If a hybrid claim is one in which a litigant would actually obtain an exemption from a formally neutral, generally applicable law under another constitutional provision, then there
would have been no reason for the Court in what [Employmen DivJ calls the hybrid cases to have mentioned the Free
Exercise Clause at all.64
Indeed, it is obviously redundant and useless to have a rule
which states if both Part A (a Free Exercise infringement) and Part B
(some other constitutional right infringement) are true, then Result C
(the statute is declared unconstitutional) will happen, if Part B would
cause Result C to occur on its own. Ultimately, this interpretation
would have the same end-result as a dicta interpretation, with the
means of reaching that result merely acknowledging the Free Exercise Clause along the way while dicta disregards it entirely.

c. COLORABLE CLAIM
The colorable claim interpretation rejects the notion that
a court must determine, independent of a free exercise claim, that
a constitutional right has been entirely violated to trigger heightened scrutiny. Instead, the conjoined rights that have been supposedly violated must have a "colorable claim'>65 to their supposition.
A strict reading of the initial proposal of the colorable claim theory
63

Church ofLukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 ( 1993) (the
Court used the Employment Div. standard regarding the neutra.lity oflaws to
condemn an in-neutral law regarding animal sacrifices in a Hi leah, Florida).

64

Jd. at 566-67 (Souter J. concurring).

65

The tenn "colorable" in the hybrid-rights context was first used by the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit when ruling against a family who
home schooled their daughter and sought relief to allow her to attend public
school on a limited part-time basis, thus asserting a religious and parental
right, see Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 700 ( I Oth Cir.

1998) (stating the court's belief that a hybrid-rights claim "at least requires
a colorable showing of infringement of recognized and specific constitutional rights, rather than the mere invocation of a general right").
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limits any hybrid-rights claims to a "recognized and specific constitutional right'>66 which precludes the idea simply claiming any
two vague rights have been violated to invoke hybrid-rights.67 The
ninth circuit appellate court clarified that a colorable claim is "a
'fair probability' or a 'likelihood,' but not a certitude, of success on
the merits.'>68 Furthermore, borrowing logic from a different court,
the two rights are not to be considered separately from each other,
but "interdependently,'>69 meaning that the reinforcing nature of the
claims gives them additional strength.
This interpretation and its caveats are a response to the problems
incurred by the dicta and the stringent interpretations70-being an
additional, frivolous standard-or by classifying hybrid rights too
broadly- the talismanic effect of simply claiming two rights have
been violated?1 Where both ofthe previous definitions fai I to provide
any additional power to a free exercise claim, the colorable-claim
interpretation gives binding strength to the two rights. Some courts
have explicitly rejected the idea that two claims which separately fail
66

/d.

67

See id. at 699 (where the court rejects the idea that "simply raising such
a claim is a ... talisman that automatically leads to the application of the
compelling interest test.").

68

Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207-8 (9th Cir. 1999), (quoting Thomas v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 700- 707 (9th Cir. 1999)).
Thomas was reversed upon rehearing en bane for technical issues, but the
theory it provided for the colorable claim interpretation has continued on
as citable law. This specification is used also by the tenth circuit court in
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1295 (lOth Cir. 2004).

69

See Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 98- 99 (I st Cir. 2008).

70

See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1296 ("Our approach strikes a middle ground
between the two extremes of painting hybrid-rights claims too generously
and construing them too narrowly.").

71

See Swanson v. Guthrie lndep. Sch. Dist., 135 FJd 694, 699 (I Oth Cir.
1998).
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to meet any sort of reasonable standard test somehow combine to
provide sufficient terms to create a strict scrutiny measure, comparing the interpretation to a mathematical error.72
This argument against the colorable claim theory holds little
weight. The colorable claim theory does not assert there is no infringement of a right, but a likelihood of infringement. Mathematically, that means there is a partial detriment to a right. Two fractions
of an infringement can combine to make, or exceed, a whole. If critics of the colorable-claim interpretations, in preference of one of the
other listed interpretation, wish to argue that two untenable claims
do not create a tenable claim, they must concede that all untenable
claims hold absolutely no merit nor create any burden on a person's
religious free exercise. The combination of partial infringements to
make a whole infringement is similar to the combination of explicit
rights to create an implicit right. If there has ever been a penumbra
created by emanating sources within the Bill of Rights, then most
certainly the combination of a free exercise right and some other
constitutional right creates such a penumbra.73
The primary weakness of the colorable-claim interpretation is
the ambiguous nature of a "colorable claim." The tenth circuit appeals court acknowledged, but did not resolve that issue in the Axson-Flynn case. The lower-court set a standard that "the companion
claim ... be 'non-frivolous."'74 The appeals court expressed grave
72

See Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("For [a hybrid-rights argument] to prevail, one would have to conclude that although
the regulation does not violate the Free Exercise Clause and although they
have no viable First Amendment claim against the regulation the combination of two untenable claims equals a tenable one. But in law as in mathematics zero plus zero equals zero.") (citations omitted).

73

See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) ("specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance.").

74

Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1295.
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concern over such a weak standard and rejected that interpretation;75
however, they did not offer a new interpretation.

v. A CALL FOR CLARITY, A CALL FOR CERTIORARI
In the absence of a definitive interpretation of hybrid rights, the
various regions of the United States are subjected to different standards by which free exercise claims are judged. With the increasing amount of hybrid-rights claims across the various circuits, it is
evident that the Supreme Court needs to settle the discrepancies by
granting certiorari for some hybrid-rights clajm, Time has shown
that the lower courts are unable to determine between themselves
how to decide these cases. Courts reject precedent within their own
circuit in favor of wb icbever definitions the judge prefers. T he only
method of reconciliation is for the Supreme Court to directly address the hybrid-rights theory and remove the confusion caused by
Employment.
Upon review, the Court has three options which will allow itselfto be consistent: overturn the Free Exercise standard in Employment, overturn the cases which constituted "hybrid situations" prior
to Employment, or clarify the meaning of the hybrid-rights doctrine.
Assuming that the Court will not want to actively assert itself upon
history, its only option is to clarify the hybrid-rights doctrine in a
way that allows the pre-Employment cases to be consistent with their
subsequent rulings.
As is shown earlier, the only interpretation which will allow the
court to be consistent with itself is the colorable-claim interpretation. The bounds set on hybrid-rights should incorporate the details
already proposed by the tenth circuit courts. Of particular importance is for the Court to establish that the "guaranteed and specified rights" language adopted by the tenth circuit is limited to those
rights explicitly delineated in the Constitution and which are treated
prominently by the Court, i.e. parenting and privacy. Instead of sepa75

See Axson-Flynn, 356 F. 3d at 1295- 96 ("The adoption of a ' non-frivolous'
standard would open the floodgates for hybrid-rights claims, as nearly every plaintiff with a free exercise claim would be able to assert an additional
non-frivolous constitutional claim.").
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rately treating the two rights, the Court should determine whether
or not the infringement of the non-religious right is caused by the
hindrance of the religious one. That is to say, the statute or policy in
question must create a situation where a person's religious beliefs or
exercises cause the constraint of some other guaranteed right. This
interdependent evaluation is necessary and makes the "fair probability" standard more pristine. This method ultimately affords the
protection to religious exercise intended by the founding fathers and
the clarity that Free Exercise jurisprudence desperately lacks in this
area.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Though the Supreme Court has many ways to deal with the
fallout of Employment, only clarifying the hybrid-rights theory will
allow the court to respect precedent. Hybrid-rights claims should
be limited to situations where an additional right is implicated as a
result of religious beliefs or actions. This interpretation will uphold
the legitimacy of the Court's free exercise findings both pre-Employment and in Employment. It also makes the Free Exercise Clause
an important part of the Constitution instead of merely a footnote
to history. Above all else, it gives Americans a more stable understanding of what their rights are and protects the treasured guarantee
given to the people by the First Amendment.

